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Update
Just Care: Rationing in a Public Health Crisis
LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS
A visitor to the lovely campus of Loma Linda University can’t miss the sculpted depiction of the parable of a good Samaritan
on the main lawn. Historically, there have been many different depictions of this famous parable, including noted ones by
Rembrandt and Van Gogh. Central to the story is the Samaritan who helps an injured traveler who was half dead after having
been beaten by robbers. The Samaritan bandaged the man’s wounds, brought him to an inn on the Samaritan’s beast, took care
of him, and arranged and agreed to pay for his subsequent care at the inn. 
In western culture, this parable helps to orient our thinking about our responsibilities to those in need of care, including, in
this case, health care. However, in some ways, it’s not a very interesting parable, because it doesn’t raise many of the ethical con-
flicts that we may face. First, providing assistance in the parable was presumably a low-risk venture. It could have been other-
wise—the rescue could have posed major risks for the rescuer. Second, the robbers presumably had already fled. It could have
been otherwise, and the rescuer might have had to decide whether to use force, even lethal force, to protect the victim from his
assailants. Finally, in the parable, the Samaritan discovered only one injured man. In a different version, there could have been
several injured people, and it would have been very difficult, probably impossible, for the Samaritan to transport all of them to
an inn, take care of them, and arrange and pay for their later care.
And yet it’s precisely such an altered scenario that is important when we begin to think ethically about possible responses to
massive public health crises that could erupt in a bioterrorist attack or a flu pandemic: what would constitute “just care” in such
cases? Before 9/11, Nobel Laureate Joshua Lederberg, in a letter dated August 30, 2001, and read before the U.S. Senate com-
mittee on foreign relations on September 5, 2001, noted the potential of a bioterrorist attack:
Considerable harm could be done (on the scale of, say, a thousand casualties) by rank amateurs. Terrorist groups, pri-
vately or state sponsored, with funds up to $1 million, could mount massive attacks of 10 to 100 times that scale.
Important to keep in mind: if the ultimate casualty roster is 1,000, there will have been 100,000 or one million at risk in
the target zone, legitimately demanding prophylactic attention, and in turn a Draconian triage.
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Disasters.” In each of the historic epidemics that might
metaphorically be called “plagues,” societies at risk had to
confront both of the issues I have identified: determining
the just distribution of scarce medical and other resources
and determining the proper balance between individual
freedom and responsibility to the community.
One other preliminary point needs to be made. When
we engage in ethical analysis and moral reasoning, for
example, about rationing or about quarantine in a public
health crisis, we often appeal to general principles, values,
and norms. Whether articulated in our foundational texts,
religious or otherwise, or embedded in our culture, or
affirmed in the professional codes of physicians and nurses,
there are some core principles, values, and norms to which
we must attend. They serve as fundamental points of refer-
ence as we try to think through
particular cases, acts, policies,
and practices.  
In the process of delibera-
tion we also engage in analogi-
cal reasoning. Our reasoning
depends in part on precedent
cases. When a crisis emerges,
we begin to think about it in
light of those precedent cases,
which represent relatively set-
tled moral judgments, and ask
whether there’s something dis-
tinctive or new that’s really so
different from what has been
faced before. Such analogical
reasoning may illuminate our decisions about the allocation
of resources or about quarantine and isolation. Sometimes,
however, we may need to rethink some of our moral prece-
dents, our settled moral judgments about kinds of cases.
JUST CARE: JUSTICE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF
HEALTH CARE
Now, as we begin to think about just care, the parable of
the Good Samaritan could, in effect, be viewed as an admo-
nition to “just care,” that is, “just to care.” The Samaritan
in the story could provide only modest care in binding the
victim’s wounds and so forth. Furthermore, in the absence
of competing loyalties to other parties at risk—for example,
other victims—he didn’t really have to face the question of
“just care,” in the sense of fair, equitable, just distribution
of care among several potential beneficiaries. 
If we inquire into “just care” in a distributive context,
one of the first points of reference is formal justice, which,
Furthermore, Lederberg continued, several simulation
exercises provide “dramatic testimony to how difficult
would be the governmental management of such incidents,
and the stresses on civil order that would follow from
inevitable inequities in that management.”
In a bioterrorist attack, we would face the very real
prospect of massive triage, difficult government manage-
ment, stresses on civil order, and inevitable inequalities
(not necessarily “inevitable inequities”) among our popu-
lace. Now, one of the questions I want to address regards
the inevitable inequalities in provision of health care in
such a crisis. The necessity to ration health care will obvi-
ously produce inequalities in treatment. The difficult ques-
tion is whether those inevitable inequalities are at the same
time inequities. Unequal distri-
bution does not necessarily sig-
nal injustice or unjust care.
While it may—and often
does—it may not do so in par-
ticular circumstances. Hence,
we need to explore various
ways to address public health
crises, if possible, without
inequities and injustice. 
Another issue of just care
that will receive some but less
attention in this lecture con-
cerns the balance of individual
freedom and communal respon-
sibility, particularly if the vic-
tims in a bioterrorist attack or in a flu pandemic become
infectious agents who can put others at risk. When would
forcible isolation and/or quarantine be ethically justifiable
as a form of just care? 
A couple of years ago I taught, with a colleague in law
and public health, a seminar titled “Confronting Plagues:
Historical and Contemporary Responses to Epidemics.”
Starting with the Black Death in the 14th century and end-
ing with the SARS outbreak, we moved back and forth in
the seminar between historical perspectives and present
realities. And, of course, in many earlier epidemics, apoca-
lyptic imagery was prominent. When much of a population
is wiped out, or at risk, especially when little is known
about the causal agent, apocalyptic imagery is quite under-
standable. Furthermore, as we think about possibilities for
our own time, such imagery may not be inappropriate,
because the scale could be massive. Hence, the title of this
conference of which this lecture is one part: “Apocalypse
Now: Seeking Justice and Protecting Rights in Health Care Please turn to page 3
“In a bioterrorist attack, we
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as Aristotle instructed us, requires that we treat similar
cases in a similar way and dissimilar cases in a dissimilar
way. But that does not take us very far—it simply lets us
know from the outset that justice requires looking at simi-
larities and differences, and treating people, or groups of
people, accordingly, if those similarities and differences are
relevant.
Any approach to justice, in a distributive sense, must also
say something about material criteria. Moving beyond the for-
mal criterion, material criteria help us identify the character-
istics that constitute relevant similarities and differences. And
here is the heart of the debate: Do we consider medical need,
ability to pay, age, and a host of other characteristics to be eth-
ically relevant from the standpoint of justice? And which ones
are relevant in a public health crisis? 
It is important to note that the language of distribution
varies a lot. Policy analysts Richard Rettig and Kathleen
Lohr once noted: 
Earlier policy makers spoke for the general problem of
allocating scarce medical resources, a formulation that
implied hard but generally manageable choices of a
largely pragmatic nature. Now the discussion increas-
ingly is of rationing scarce medical resources, a harsher
term that connotes emergency, even wartime circum-
stances, requiring some societal triage mechanism.

Although this comment was directed at problems of dis-
tributing health care in the society at large, it applies with
particular force to the distribution of various kinds of health
care—for example, vaccines, prophylactic measures, ther-
apy, and supportive care—after a bioterrorist attack or in a
flu pandemic. “Allocation,” “rationing,” and “triage” do
have somewhat different connotations. In ordinary dis-
course, “rationing” and “triage” seem harsher than “alloca-
tion,” or, for that matter, “distribution,” and “patient
selection,” among other terms. All of the latter terms seem
more descriptive and neutral. Generally, “triage” implies
systematic rationing using classifications of potential bene-
ficiaries, based on need and probable outcomes, in an
attempt to do “the greatest good for the greatest number”
(utility). 
These different terms clearly have a bearing on public
communication and justification of distributional systems.
But even a rigorous distributional system, which may seem
harsh and perhaps Draconian, may not be unjust and unjus-
tified. In assessing different systems, we need to determine
which principles of justice are relevant for thinking about
distribution in a public health crisis. In effect, which mate-
“Just Care: Rationing in a Public Health Crisis” continued… rial principles identify the morally relevant similarities and
differences?
I want to focus on two major kinds of principles, utilitar-
ian ones and egalitarian ones. And I will argue that while
these principles sometimes come into conflict, they need
not always conflict. When they appear to conflict, we need
to examine them very closely and imaginatively in the situ-
ation to determine whether the conflict is real or only
apparent and whether one principle is weightier or stronger
than the other in that situation. 
Utility requires, in its simple formulation from Jeremy
Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and others, that we do the
greatest good for the greatest number. But that formulation
does not help us very much in trying to determine whether
a utilitarian approach is compatible with egalitarian princi-
ples that might be based, for example, on convictions about
human beings as created in God’s image or as destined for
union with God.
It is only when we specify how utilitarian principles are
or can be used that we can see whether there is a conflict or
not and, if so, how it arises and can be resolved. So, let me
distinguish the principle of social utility, where the aim is to
maximize social welfare, from the principle of medical util-
ity, where the aim is to maximize the welfare of persons suf-
fering from or at risk for disease, trauma, and the like. 
UTILITARIAN PRINCIPLES: SOCIAL UTILITY AND
MEDICAL UTILITY
Medical utility—doing the greatest medical good for the
greatest number—involves two major considerations. One
is medical need, which may be urgent, or moderate, or
weak. The other is the probability of a successful outcome
through a medical intervention. 
Sometimes these considerations come into conflict—a
person who has an urgent medical need may also have a low
chance of surviving even if the treatment is provided. For
example, in organ transplantation, a patient’s urgent medical
need may reduce the probability that a transplant will be suc-
cessful. However, in medical utility, we may have to balance
medical need and probability of successful outcome. 
Following this quick and rough sketch of medical utility,
we can ask: what is social utility? Here, as noted earlier, the
aim is to maximize social welfare. Again, we need to draw
some distinctions, particularly between broad social utility
and narrow social utility. In judgments of broad social util-
ity, we consider a person’s overall worth or value to the soci-
ety. Judgments of broad social utility in rationing would
lead to the provision of resources for the person(s) who
would have the greatest comparative social worth or value.
Please turn to page 4
or functions for priority in rationing.
This is very different from judging whether a person has
greater overall value or worth to society than someone else.
Instead, attention is paid to specific, valuable, and essential
roles and functions in a focused community. Nevertheless,
hard questions will still arise about how to determine which
social functions and roles are essential and, thus, should
receive priority in the allocation of resources. 
We can probe some of these hard questions by critically
examining criteria proposed for allocation of health care after
an attack with weapons of mass destruction. In a very helpful
article a few years ago, Nikki Pesik and colleagues identified
acceptable and unacceptable criteria for use in rationing health
care in the context of such an attack. Most of the criteria they
deemed acceptable focus on
medical utility. Relevant ques-
tions based on these criteria
include: What is the likelihood of
benefit? What is the effect on
improving quality of life? What is
the duration of benefit? What is
the urgency of the patient’s con-
dition? These questions probe
medical utility, doing the greatest
good for the greatest number of
people, medically. 
The authors also propose
consideration of direct multi-
plier effect among emergency
caregivers, a consideration that
begins to blur the principles of medical utility and social
utility. Emergency care is a social role but the concern here
is primarily with its medical impact. In my judgment, it
would also be justifiable to move beyond the social roles
and functions that address the medical needs, because in a
true public health crisis, social roles and functions that
address transportation, security, etc., will also be vitally
important. The final acceptable consideration proposed by
Pesik et al. focuses on the amount of resources required for
successful treatment. This is similar to what Gerald
Winslow has called a principle of conservation, and it too
reflects medical utility. 
In general, Pesik and colleagues have identified accept-
able specifications of medical utility. They also present a
list of unacceptable criteria, and, by and large, I agree with
this list of excluded criteria as well: age, ethnicity, or gen-
der; talents, abilities, disabilities, or deformities; socio-
economic status, social worth, or political position; co-exis-
tent conditions that do not affect short-term prognosis; drug
dr
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Narrow social utility is different. It focuses on particular
social roles and functions. It asks whether some roles and
functions are indispensable, perhaps in a crisis even if not
in ordinary times. Should some people receive special pri-
ority in a public health crisis because of their particular
roles or functions? Paul Ramsey, one of the pioneers in
bioethics and the author of The Patient As Person (1970), gen-
erally argued against appeals to social utility. Working out of
a theological perspective, he contended that we should be
indiscriminate in the care we provide—just as God makes
the rain fall on the just and the unjust alike, and the sun
shine on the just and the unjust alike. For him “just care”
is indiscriminate care. 
Obviously, rationing involves
discrimination—it gives some
people, for some reason, priority
over others. However, the 
question is whether such dis-
crimination among potential
beneficiaries is unjust. Ramsey’s
reasoning draws on analogical
cases as well as on general prin-
ciples, such as indiscriminate
care and utility. His main anal-
ogy is to the lifeboat cases that
have been prominent in reli-
gious and philosophical dis-
course over the centuries. 
Suppose there is a shipwreck
and several people, indeed too many, get on the lifeboat. It
is clear that not everyone can be saved because the lifeboat
is too crowded and at risk of sinking. Attempting to save
everyone could cost everyone’s life. Would it be appropriate
to draw lots or make judgments of social utility in order to
determine who should be saved? In light of his theological
perspective, Ramsey emphasized drawing lots as a form of
just care. Indeed, there are biblical grounds for casting lots
as a way to discern the divine will (e.g., when the disciples
replaced Judas).
But Ramsey also conceded that, under some circum-
stances, it is justifiable to make discriminating judg-
ments based on narrow social utility. For instance, it
would be unwise to include everyone on the lifeboat in
a lottery if that meant throwing overboard the only peo-
ple with enough maritime skills to help the lifeboat stay
afloat and to increase the chances of rescue. In short,
Ramsey conceded that in a “focused community,” con-
centrated on communal survival (e.g., on the lifeboat), it
may be appropriate to single out certain essential roles
“Just Care: Rationing in a Public Health Crisis” continued…
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determine which principles of
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and alcohol abuse; and anti-social or aggressive behaviors.
However much we may be tempted to use some of these
criteria, they are ultimately ethically indefensible for
rationing in a public health crisis. They are not required by
medical utility or by narrow social utility, and they are
excluded by egalitarian principles.
EGALITARIAN PRINCIPLES
I’ve already appealed to egalitarian principles, but what
exactly do they entail? What is crucial for me here, in lan-
guage borrowed from Ronald Dworkin, is that we treat each
person as an equal even if we cannot provide equal treat-
ment. Egalitarian principles require recognition and treat-
ment of others as equals. However, they do not require
identical treatment or the provision of the same thing to
everyone. Fair rationing can be justifiable even in a frame-
work that involves equal regard or, as Dworkin states it,
equal concern and respect. In addition, decisions about
unequal treatments, for instance, in rationing, must reflect
fair procedures, and the distribution should be fair—it
should be just care. 
Egalitarian principles do not necessarily preclude judg-
ments of medical utility or even narrow social utility in cer-
tain circumstances, but appeal to broad social utility or
broad social worth, which Pesik and colleagues reject, is dif-
ficult to justify in light of egalitarian principles. 
Egalitarian principles may support impersonal mecha-
nisms of allocation, such as queuing or a lottery, in different
settings. For instance, if the preventive or therapeutic
interventions cannot be provided for all of those in the pri-
ority groups set by medical utility, and more discriminating
judgments of medical utility are not possible, then queuing
or a lottery may be justified by egalitarian principles. In
addition, if resources remain after treating the priority
groups set by medical utility and by narrow social utility,
then egalitarian principles could also justify the use of
queuing or a lottery for the remainder. 
In any event, it is important to remember that all meth-
ods of allocation must be justified to the public, in part
because the public’s cooperation is utterly indispensable to
the society’s successful response to a public health crisis. 
A TEST CASE: ALLOCATION OF FLU VACCINE
FALL, 2004
It may be useful to examine, as a test case, what occurred
during the fall of 2004 in the allocation of scarce flu vaccine.
Around the country and to different degrees, flu vaccine allo-
cation basically involved medical utility and narrow social
utility (embodying the principle of utility) and queuing and
lotteries (embodying egalitarian principles). 
The basic framework for allocation of the flu vaccine
was set by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), which identified eight priority
groups based largely on risk: all children 6 to 23 months;
adults 65 years and older; persons aged 2 to 24 years
with underlying chronic medical conditions; all women
who will be pregnant during influenza season; residents
of nursing homes and longterm care facilities; children 6
months to 18 years of age on chronic aspirin therapy;
health care workers with direct patient care; and out-of-
home caregivers and household contacts of children
aged less than 6 months. 
The CDC came up with those priority groups based on
what I have called medical utility. Beyond these priority
groups, which were considered to be of “equal impor-
tance,” it recommended “first-come, first-served” both
within and across those groups if scarcity prevented vacci-
nation of all in the priority groups. Some jurisdictions used
a lottery among individuals in priority groups. In addition,
there was also some priority based on social function,
beyond the health care workers with direct patient care. 
I will quickly develop further features of this case study
and consider the rationale used for—or implicit in—differ-
ent allocation measures. Clearly the utilitarian and egalitar-
ian principles I have emphasized were prominent, but
practical considerations, including feasibility, were also
important. After all, state and local public health officials
and others had to determine whether a particular allocation
method could be undertaken, what kinds of logistical prob-
lems it would encounter, whether those problems could be
overcome, etc. The cooperation of the public was crucial as
was the cooperation of health care professionals, especially
because the allocation of the flu vaccine involved both pri-
vate institutions, physicians, and other health care profes-
sionals, on the one hand, and public health officials, on the
other. 
As noted, the justification for the CDC’s priority groups
focused on individuals most at risk for morbidity and mor-
tality. The problem was that the pool was still too large.
Thus, hard decisions were left to state and local health
departments about how to address rationing in and among
eight priority groups of equal importance. One possibility
to consider was further prioritization. But there was too
much scientific uncertainty.
As a result, queuing (i.e., “first-come, first-served”)
became important as a way to provide fair equality of
opportunity to individuals in priority groups. Some persons
in priority groups had limited mobility; others had work
dr
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commitments. And some persons suffered health crises—
including at least one death—while waiting in line for a flu
vaccine. As a result, even though “first-come, first-served”
(which Ramsey viewed as an ongoing lottery) is in principle
an acceptable method, its implementation evoked concerns
about both risk and fairness.
A partial solution to these problems, in some jurisdic-
tions, was “first-call, first-served.” Individuals in priority
groups could call and obtain a number in order to receive
the vaccine at a scheduled time. In other jurisdictions, a lot-
tery was adopted among individuals in priority groups,
because of the problems with “first-come, first-served.”
Another ethical concern about either queuing or a lottery
focuses on background conditions, such as access to health
care, transportation, etc., that
often determine who will enter
the pool and when. 
In the flu vaccine shortage of
2004, social functions were also
used as a prioritizing tool. As
noted previously, the CDC pri-
oritized health care workers
with direct patient contact. The
justification here is a mixture of
medical and social utility. But a
big problem is determining
which functions and which
roles are more important and
even essential as well as who
decides these matters. It was
easy for the public to endorse the priority assigned to the
operational forces in the global war on terror, as the
Department of Defense proposed. When people objected
to the priority given to members of Congress, several mem-
bers declined the vaccine. Even more problematic was the
allocation of flu vaccine to the players on the Chicago Bears
football team! Decisions about essential roles and functions
for purposes of setting priorities in rationing in a public
health crisis need public input especially because the pub-
lic’s trust is necessary for the success of any rationing pro-
gram in a public health crisis. 
LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY: JUSTIFYING
QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION
Beyond rationing, I want to note a few other problems of
public trust, particularly related to liberty and freedom of
movement. When the initial victims become the uninten-
tional secondary agents of bioterrorism or infectious dis-
ease, it may be justifiable to resort to isolation and
6
quarantine. (Isolation restricts individuals who have the
disease in question, while quarantine restricts individuals
who have been exposed to the disease but may not have it.)
Both isolation and quarantine can be voluntary or involun-
tary or non-voluntary. One important commitment of a lib-
eral society is to use voluntary measures whenever possible.
However, coercive quarantine or isolation can be justified
under several conditions, reflected in the following ques-
tions: Would it be effective? Is there a balance between the
probable good and the probable negative effects? Is it nec-
essary? Is it the least restrictive or intrusive? Is it impartially
applied? These are all important ethical considerations, as
well as (frequently) legal ones, in thinking about quaran-
tine and isolation. 
Mark Rothstein and colleagues at the University of
Louisville conducted a study for
the CDC on how countries
around the world responded to
SARS. Different societies imple-
mented quarantine and isolation
by requests for voluntary cooper-
ation, provision of incentives, or
coercion, or some combination of
these approaches. Canada, by
and large, relied on voluntary
quarantine and isolation, which
worked well for the most part.
Many wonder whether voluntary
isolation and quarantine would
work as well in the United
States, particularly because we
may be more individualistic in our orientation than Canada
and a number of the other countries that were afflicted with
SARS. 
Let me draw a distinction between imposing community
and expressing community. Clearly, in coercive quarantine and
isolation, a society attempts to impose communal responsi-
bility through coercion. It attempts to make people respon-
sible at least to the extent of not engaging in actions that
would put others at risk. For the most part, in our society as
well as in Canada, imposition of community should be a last
resort.
One alternative is to seek to engender voluntary cooper-
ation and compliance by expressing community and com-
munal solidarity. A big difference between the United
States and Canada is that the latter has universal access to
health care. In such a context, it may be easier to convince
people that the society is on their side than in a setting
where more than 45 million people are uninsured and millions
UPDATE Volume 20, Number 3
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bibliography of millions of students around the world. In
addition to this and others of his publications, his work on
multiple federal government panels, commissions, and coun-
sels has been influential in the development of social policy
for the United States. 
What we publish here for our readers is the core material
from a lecture that Dr. Childress presented for our annual
Jack W. Provonsha Lecture, in the spring of 2005. His lecture
was placed in the evening between the two days of our 2005
national conference titled, “Apocalypse
Now: Seeking Justice and Protecting
Rights in Health Care Disasters.”
Among other items noted in our confer-
ence and in Dr. Childress’ lecture we
find reflection upon the issue of quaran-
tine in situations of health care crisis. As
I write this editorial our country’s presi-
dent is talking about the possibilities of
limitations of travel and quarantine in
the face of a possible bird flu pandemic!
This article by Dr. Childress will help
shape our thoughts on such matters now,
and for years to come. 
Mark Carr, PhD, MDiv
Co-Director, 
Center for Christian Bioethics
For the entirety of our existence as a Center for Christian
Bioethics here at Loma Linda University (21 years now),
James F. Childress, PhD, has been a key thought leader in
the field. We are so pleased to include his article in this edi-
tion of UPDATE. Along with his colleague and co-author, Tom
L. Beauchamp, PhD, Dr. Childress has shaped the field of
bioethics in this country and abroad since the initial publica-
tion of Principles of Biomedical Ethics in 1979. This text is now
in its fifth edition and remains an essential reading on the
7
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Allen Hollingsworth professor of ethics,
director of the Institute for Practical Ethics,
and public life professor of medical educa-
tion at the University of Virginia.
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Editorial
more are underinsured. I would argue that, wherever possi-
ble, we should express community rather than imposing it.
Nevertheless, in some circumstances, imposition of com-
munity may be necessary. 
When societies confront tragic choices—where funda-
mental social-cultural values are at stake—they must, as
Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbit stress in their book
Tragic Choices, “attempt to make allocations in ways that
preserve the moral foundations of social collaboration,” or,
in my language, to create and maintain public trust. The
same point holds for measures to ensure quarantine and iso-
lation. With luck, following a bioterrorist attack or pan-
demic flu or some other public health crisis, a society will
return to normal life. But normal life presupposes that “the
moral foundations of social collaboration” are still intact.
“Just care” can help to preserve those foundations while
responding effectively to the public health crisis. n
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My working definition of ethics
is not composed of a clear-cut stan-
dard for what morally speaking is right and wrong, but rather
how morals, personal ethics, and life situations influence the
actions we choose and how these actions affect others. When
I was a young student in the Christian bioethics program at
Loma Linda University, a professor once said that “the law
tells us what we cannot do, while ethics tells us what we ought
to do.” As I delved into learning basic principles of ethics and
gained experience within the clinical setting, I realized that
ethics training provides a foundational framework that allows
us to make the most caring and respectful decisions in the face
of seemingly hopeless situations that manifest themselves in
the clinical setting.
Two common questions that I am asked when I tell people
what my graduate degree is in are “what is that?” and “what
do you do?” The worth of graduate education for some inher-
ently involves jobs, businesses, and publications you produce
after you graduate. I never went into the bioethics program to
produce anything, but rather did so to seek understanding not
only of the foundational components of ethics but also of how
they relate to the medical field. What I gained was a better
understanding of how my own morality and/or personal ethic
affect the decisions I make on a daily basis. And the natural
progression after discovering how one thinks is to learn to rec-
ognize the motivations behind decisions made by family
members, patients, and caregivers in the clinical setting. 
This form of understanding is what helps clinical ethicists dis-
cover underlying factors that often contribute to ethical dilem-
mas in health care, thereby enabling them to develop options for
resolving those dilemmas. In the biomedical and clinical ethics
program you study religion, philosophy, ethics, spirituality, 
law, and many other disciplines. The most important
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subject of study however is the complexities of the human
spirit and how it is affected by health and disease. There are
no high paying corporate jobs for such knowledge, but the
richness of this form of study is invaluable.
Since graduating from Loma Linda University I am con-
tinuing my graduate education both at Loma Linda
University and Claremont School of Theology where I hope
to earn my terminal degree. My ethics degree has opened
up doors that even I never thought possible. I currently
teach online ethics courses for the bachelor of science in
nursing and master’s level nursing students attending Regis
University in Denver, Colorado. Utilizing technology to dis-
cuss ethics with future and practicing nurses has been a
wonderful form of continuing education in and of itself.
This past summer I co-wrote new ethics curriculum for first-
year medical students at Western University of Health
Sciences and just finished several hours of lecture to more
than 200 future physicians. 
The reaction of the students to the topics covered and
spirited discussion reaffirmed my belief in the importance of
ethics education and my desire to be involved in it. Future
endeavors are the writing of second-year curriculum for the
medical students at Western and continuing my own studies.
I am thankful for the academic experience at Loma Linda
University as well as the personal relationships built with
students, faculty, and staff. In closing I will state that I have
not gained personal wealth, prestige, or social status by
studying ethics, but the knowledge and appreciation I have
with regard to how ethics affects our everyday lives in and
outside of the clinical setting is of much greater worth and
has brought me true personal wholeness!
Rachel Mason
Class of 2002
Certificate biomedical 
and clinical ethics
Loma Linda University
My experience in the biomed-
ical and clinical ethics program at
Loma Linda University was truly rewarding and enriching.
Since all of my education has been focused on psychology
and end-of-life issues, I found the ethics program to be a
complementary addition to the breadth of my educational
growth. I found myself in an industry I am passionate about.
With this issue of UPDATE we are starting a new section
dedicated to our nearly 40 graduates of Loma Linda
University’s biomedical and clinical ethics program. Each
issue will highlight one or two of the graduates, what their
experience at Loma Linda meant to them, and what they are
doing now. 
Please turn to page 12
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Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Religious Perspective
In February 2005, California legislators introduced assembly bill 654, the California Compassionate Choice Act, shaped in the
image of Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act. Although the bill was recently sent back to committee, this legislation was written with
the intent to move Californian society in the direction of allowing physicians to help patients end their lives. Do we want our society
to move in this direction? Could there be reasonable Christian arguments to support this legislation? What of other religious perspec-
tives on this issue? With these questions in mind, the Center for Christian Bioethics has gathered an outstanding group of scholars who
will speak to the religious perspective of physician assisted suicide at the 2006 Jack W. Provonsha Lecture Series. The 10-week Jack
W. Provonsha Lecture Series will meet each Thursday evening beginning January 5, 2006, and ending March 9, 2006. Loma Linda
University students may attend the lectures for credit; health care professionals may attend the lectures for continuing education pur-
poses; and community members may attend the lectures purely out of interest in the topic, at no cost to themselves. An opportunity
like this does not happen often; please be sure to mark your calendar to attend the 2006 Jack W. Provonsha Lecture Series.
January 5, 2006
DENNIS PRAGER, PHD
University Church
7:00 p.m.
A 23-year veteran in talk radio,
Dennis Prager is “one of America’s
best five speakers,” according to
Toastmasters. Dr. Prager has a
pulse on ethical issues and has
been referred to as a “moral compass” and someone whose
mission has been “to get people obsessed with what is right
and wrong.” Dr. Prager is known for his interfaith dialogues
with representatives from virtually every religion in the
world in addition to being a well-published author.
January 12, 2006
DAVID NOVAK, PHD
Randall Visitors Center
7:00 p.m.
David Novak, PhD, holds the J.
Richard and Dorothy Shiff Chair
of Jewish Studies as professor of
the study of religion, professor of
philosophy, director of the Jewish
Studies Programme, and member of University College and
the Joint Centre for Bioethics at the University of Toronto
since 1997. He is founder, vice president, and coordinator of
the panel of inquiry on Jewish law of the Union for
Traditional Judaism and founder of the Institute of
Traditional Judaism in Teaneck, New Jersey, where he regu-
larly lectures. Dr. Novak is primarily engaged in the study of
the philosophical aspects of the Jewish legal tradition. He is
the author of nine books and numerous articles that have
appeared in numerous scholarly and intellectual journals.
SCHEDULE OF SPEAKERS
presents
LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR
CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS
L E C T U R E S E R I E S
Jack W. Provonsha 
and practices on mental and physical health outcomes. A grant
application from AHRS is now pending at the National
Institute of Aging. Dr. Walters’ most recent work, Martin Buber
and Feminist Ethics, appeared in the fall 2003.
February 9, 2006
Margaret Mohrmann, MD, PhD
Randall Visitors Center
7:00 p.m.
Margaret Mohrmann, MD, PhD,
completed her residency in pedi-
atrics from John Hopkins and served
as director of the pediatric residency
program and medical director of the
pediatric intensive care unit at Medical University of South
Carolina, before pursuing a PhD in religious studies from the
University of Virginia. Remaining at the University of Virginia,
she is currently Harrison Medical Teaching associate professor of
pediatrics and associate professor of both medical education and
religious studies. She has authored Medicine As Ministry: Reflections
on Suffering, Ethics, and Hope, and co-edited Pain Seeking
Understanding: Suffering, Medicine, and Faith. Her most recent
book is Attending Children: A Doctor’s Education.
February 16, 2006
S. CROMWELL CRAWFORD, PHD
Randall Visitors Center
7:00 p.m.
S. Cromwell Crawford, PhD,
joined the University of Hawaii,
where he has had a long and dis-
tinguished career as professor and
now chair of the department of
religion. Dr. Crawford has been involved in several research
projects abroad in places such as London, Bombay, and
Brazil. His publications are numerous and varied but focus
primarily on Hindu bioethics, world religions, and global
ethics.
February 23, 2006
ABDULAZIZ SACHEDINA, PHD
Randall Visitors Center
7:00 p.m.
With an MA/PhD from the
University of Toronto, and having
lectured widely across the globe,
Dr. Sachedina is internationally
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January 19, 2006
H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT JR.,
MD, PHD
Randall Visitors Center
7:00 p.m.
H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr., MD,
PhD, holds full professorship,
department of philosophy, Rice
University, is professor emeritus,
department of medicine and department of community
medicine, Baylor College of Medicine, and is a member of
the Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy. Dr.
Engelhardt is senior editor of the journal Christian Bioethics
and editor of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. He is also
senior editor of the book series Philosophical Studies in
Contemporary Culture and editor of the Philosophy and Medicine
series with about 90 volumes in print. 
January 26, 2006
ANA S. ILTIS, PHD
Randall Visitors Center
7:00 p.m.
Completing her PhD from Rice
University with a dissertation titled
“A Philosophical Exploration of the
Possibility and Implications of
Institutional Moral Agency,” Dr.
Iltis specializes in the area of human subjects research and
organizational ethics. She joined the faculty of the Center for
Health Care Ethics at Saint Louis University in January 2003
as a tenured-track assistant professor. In addition to her faculty
position, Dr. Iltis is assistant editor of the Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy and co-editor of the Annals of Bioethics, a book
series published by Routledge.
February 2, 2006
JAMES W. WALTERS, PHD
Randall Visitors Center
7:00 p.m.
James Walters, PhD, is a profes-
sor of religion at Loma Linda
University. He is now the principal
investigator of the Adventist Health
and Religion Study (AHRS), a pro-
ject looking at the possible effect of religious beliefs, values,
“Jack W. Provonsha Lecture Series” continued…
known and respected in his field. He is currently professor of
religious studies at the University of Virginia and a core mem-
ber of the “Islamic Roots of Demographic Pluralism” project in
the CSIS preventive diplomacy program and a key contributor
to the program’s efforts to link religion to universal needs and
values in the service of peace-building. Dr. Sachedina’s numer-
ous articles can be found in various journals and publications in
addition to encyclopedias and dictionaries.
March 2, 2006
BEN CARSON, MD
University Church
5:30 p.m.
Benjamin Carson, MD, com-
pleted his residency at Johns
Hopkins Hospital before acting as
the senior registrar in neurosurgery
at Sir Charles Gairdner Hospital in
Western Australia. As the director of the division of pediatric
neurosurgery and co-director of the Johns Hopkins
Craniofacial Center, Dr. Carson is a leading physician in his
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highly specialized field. Active in research programs as well as
clinical practice, Dr. Carson is also known for his three best-
selling books, Gifted Hands, Think Big, and The Big Picture.
March 9, 2006
GERALD WINSLOW, PHD
University Church
7:00 p.m.
Gerald Winslow, PhD, is profes-
sor of ethics at Loma Linda
University. For the past 30 years,
he has specialized in teaching and
writing about ethics, especially
health care ethics and resource allocation. His books include
Triage and Justice and Facing Limits. His articles have
appeared in such journals as Western Journal of Medicine,
Journal of Pediatrics, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy,
Hastings Center Report, and General Dentistry. He has pre-
sented lectures and seminars throughout North America and
in Australia, Europe, and China. In addition to his academic
work, Dr. Winslow serves as an ethics consultant to a number
of health care organizations.
“Jack W. Provonsha Lecture Series” continued…
Thursday evenings 
7:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.
January 5, 2006 
through 
March 9, 2006
The 2006 
Jack W. Provonsha Lecture Series
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For more information on the 
Provonsha Lecture Series, 
please contact Dawn Gordon at 
Loma Linda University, 
Center for Christian Bioethics, 
at (909) 558-4956, or dpgordon@llu.edu
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Change Service Requested
I am currently working as the business and community
development officer at Hospice of the Valleys in Sun City,
California. My unique background in psychology and ethics
has served me well in this position. I find that I am able to
better communicate with other health care professionals
about the challenges of end-of-life care because I understand
the moral and ethical concerns that they have about end-of-
life issues. For example, the recent right to die case of Teri
Schiavo was brought to my doorstep when a local newspaper
called Hospice of the Valleys looking for education about the
Graduate profiles continued... issues being brought up by the case. I feel that my education
and experiences in the ethics program allowed me to clearly
communicate the underlying issues and express the true
nature of the case; such that, the emotion and biases could be
set aside and the crux of the matter was exposed. I feel for-
tunate that I had many excellent mentors in the ethics pro-
gram and know that I try to continually honor their
investment in me.
The next gradate profile will be in UPDATE 21.1.
